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Anti-Oedipus, Lynch: Initiatory Rites
and the Ordeal of Justice
RICHARD K. SHERWIN

The path to heaven leads through the abyss.
Friedrich Schelling, Philosophy of Religion

Initiation lies at the core of any genuine human life.
Mircea Eliade, Rites a11d Symbols of foitia1.io11

Reversal is the direction of study which transforms existence into script.
Its new teacher is Bucephalus, "the new advocate," who takes the road
back without the powerful Alexander-which means, rid of the
onrushing conqueror ... [H]e reads and turns the pages of our old
books ... The law which is studied but no longer practiced is the gate to
justice.

Walter Benjamin, "Franz Kafka"

Introduction: "Law Dreams"
Law dreams, and forgets. It forgets its dreams and forgets that it dreams. Law
dreams of law: its hidden fantasies, desires, impulses, fears. Like all dreamers,
law dreams in images: taboo symbols, intimating forbidden knowledge amid
forbidden urges. We repress law's disorder for the sake of its order. We repress its violence for the sake of its legitimacy. But as Freud taught, the price
of repression is inescapable. In symptoms of disorder, the repressed returns.
The dreams of law haunt the law. Its ghost, like Hamlet's father, returns to
set things right. In daylight, law rules paternally, as infallible judge. But at
night-and let us include the simulated night o[ darkened theaters-its demons (and perhaps also its angels) roam. On silver screens, the symbolic life
of the law breathes free.
In what follows, we will explore the dream life o[ law. This is the scene of
law's otherness, its repressed others. When we visit the dream space of Law
we confront law's debt to its own unconscious. Naked, incoherent forces and
untapped meaning-making power lie buried in the symbolic life of the Jaw.
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We go there in search of a reckoning with law's debt. This coming to account
is a making good and a putting right. And while the books of law may never
be fully squared, the effort to balance its accounts remains salutary. Passing
through the hell of confrontation, daring to face that which terrifies us and
makes us want to forget, raises hope for illumination. Undertaking this rite
of passage initiates a renewed awareness of forgotten sources of culture and
meaning that may help to revitalize the dead letter of the law. That deadness,
I shall argue, consists in the historic collapse of the symbolic life of the law.
When we dare to call back to mind the initiatory rites of the ordeal of justice
another memory stirs. Yes, law dreams.
It is fitting that we undertake this act of remembrance now, for we are
living in the age of the image. It is in the image that we may explore law's
rule together with its reveries and torments. Symbols, as in a dream , display
the mythic origin of law. Consider in this regard the story of Oedipus, the
king. His powers of detection were unsurpassed . Oedipus alone unraveled
the Sphinx's riddle, thus gaining lawful rule over Thebes. But Oedipus carried a secret. Murder was also a precursor to his rule. When Oedipus unwittingly killed his own father he released the very seat of power that he would
occupy. For Freud, this act of parricide is paramount. Law begins with the
death of the primal father. For us, however, the emphasis will shift. It is not
simply violence against the father that will concern us, but also, and more
significantly, the radical misplacement of (and perverse forbearance from)
violence.
In the ancient myth of kingly succession, it is the symbolic figure of the
feminine that must be confronted and worked through. In the rite of royal
investiture, the king's rightful successor must engage in combat with the
dragon. The hero who vanquishes the female monster frees the bride. Along
the way, he undergoes a symbolic sacrifice. The monster swallows him up,
only to spit him back out. The hero -initiate thus undergoes symbolic rebirth.
It is this ancient rite of succession that Oedipus confounds. His misplaced
violence against the paternal force and his blind (perverse) fusion with the
monstrous feminine brings plague to the kingdom-sure sign of Oedipus's
illegitimate rule. Arch detective that he is, Oedipus will in time unravel the
mystery of his crime. And his confrontation with the horror of his deeds, the
trauma of b[e)aring forbidden knowledge, will trigger his tragic fall from
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highest to lowest. Oedipus's fate is to become a lonely exile in the land of the
blind. Only after a lifetime of suffering will he achieve purification and gain
the insight that wins him redemption at Colon us.
In what follows, I shall argue that in the film work of David Lynch we
witness a reenactment of Oedipus's desecration of the founding rites of law's
legitimacy. Lynch's Mulholland Drive (1001) invites us to encounter the
dream life of law. Like the Oedipus myth, Lynch's film is structured as a
mystery. lt is a metaphysical mystery of identity and repression, of forbidden
impulses and the thousand and one tales that we tell to divert us from hidden truths. Yet, these tales are also clues. We dream the symptomatic signs of
our repression and interpret what the images mean . Before taking their
meaning to heart, however, we must first experience a tear in quotidian reality. The rite begins in violence.
Not surprisingly, at least on this account, it is with violence that the story
of Mulholland Drive unfurls. A car accident at night; dead bodies strewn
around a smoldering black limousine. A detective holds up a plastic bag
containing a pearl earring and says, "The boys found this on the floor in back
of the Caddy." His partner responds, "Yeah, they showed me .... Any of
those dead kids wearin' pearl earrings?" The detective: "No. Could be someone's missin' maybe." Partner: "That's what I'm thinkin '." The mystery has
begun.
We are about to enter the labyrinth of identity and its fragments in the
Lynchian theater of dreams. It is also the stage upon which law and its unconscious will play out. if on the way down into the Lynchian abyss we confront forms of cultural and intrapsychic discord that cry out for recognition
and redress, the hope is that our insightful attunement to the terrifying realities that we encounter will ultimately help to restore a healthier psychic and
cultural balance. Further exploration of such a restorative possibility, however, remains premature. The immediate task before us is to cast ourselves,
like a Dantesque pilgrim, into David Lynch's interior purgatory of violence,
terror, and death . Before encountering the promise of light, under such guise
as the times may allow, we must first venture downward, to a place where
horrific forces await us. That place is David Lynch's Mulholland Drive.
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Law as Initiation Rite: Going Down with David Lynch
My dreams arc your actions.
Leontia in Shakespeare's A Wi11ter's Tale

Doubtless, each organ-machine interprets the entire world from the
perspective of its own flux, from the point of view of the energy that
flows from it.
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A11ti-Oedipus

Lynch's 'Mulholland Drive'
Mulholland Drive consists of a series of subversions, as film director Lynch,
with infinite craft, leads (one is tempted to say "seduces" or "tricks") the
viewer from one plane of reality to another. The first two-thirds of the film
turn out to be a dream fantasy, though we have no way of knowing this is so
until later in the film. Only then do we realize that what we have taken as real
life is not so. Lynch plainly wants us to experience this realization as a shock.
It is the shock of suddenly "waking up" to an illusion that we've mistaken for
reality. The play of reality and illusion is a central motif of the film, as the
penultimate scene at Cafe Silencio will later reveal. Our disorientation is
complete when, instead of allowing us to remain within the stable realm of
what we subsequently take as real life, the film upends our expectations yet
again. Like an infinite regression, Lynch's film in the end reintroduces, and
yields to, powerful irrational elements. The unreality of incomprehensible
("monstrous")' forces now finally invades, and throws into question, the reliability of any assumptions we may have held regarding the stability of real
life. We realize that the same unreality that launched this drama of jealousy,
hatred, and violent retribution-the same unbearable forces that staged its
figuration and violent denouement-remain present at the end, as at the beginning. There is no stable place for us to hold still in. As we shall see, this
destabilizing [de]realization links Lynch's work to key elements in the distinctive culture of the baroque.
The initial dream fantasy sequence, which dominates the film, plays out as
a murder mystery-as well as a mystery of identity. In time, we will learn
that this mystery is the projected fantasy of Diane Selwyn. Upon repeated
viewings, one may discern clues, both in style and content, that disturb the
linear ("real life-like") flow of the opening story frame. On the whole, how-
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ever, the initial sto1y frame offers none of the conventional markers of a
dream narrative. The general inclination is lo take the mystery straight. We
realize our mistake when a second story frame unfolds-the story of Diane's
real life. When Diane awakens we see, for the first time, elements of her inner and outer world (the psychic conflicts and real-life characters) that make
up Diane's dream fantasy. Yet, just as we manage to decode that fantasy from
the details of Diane Selwyn's tawdry, conflict-ridden life, the dream images
that we have been viewing do not simply dissolve into a restored normality-a la Dorothy's homecoming to Kansas upon her awakening in The Wiz-

ard of Oz.
In Lynch's hands, there is no reprieve from the grip of chaotic unconscious forces. Unlike Dorothy, Diane Selwyn awakens to a horror that utterly
overwhelms her. That final horror is the abyss of infinite desire. It has been
present from the beginning. It is that out of which the film comes, and back
into which it dissolves. This is the Lynchian (postmodern) sublime, the final
subversion-and there is no reality to stabilize its significance. For Lynch,
there is no escape, no awakening, only the endless play of schizoidal fantasy. 2
Folds (of desire) pass into other folds, "folding into folding to infinity,'" like
endless arabesques, forming and reforming against the void. Here we reencounter the infinitude of the postmodern sublime as baroque excess, as the
schizoidal self that fractures into infinite monadic possibilities.'' This mise en

abyme is a definitive feature of both the postmodern and the neo-baroque
sublime. 5 In its folding of real life back into the ("monstrous") reality of desire, Mulholland Drive becomes an anti-Wizard of Oz. For in place of restabilized reality, Lynch's baroque fantasy culminates in the schizoidal sublime
of Deleuze and Guattari. 6 Lynch is anti-Oedipus, the anti-philosopher. 7
In what follows, I shall try to make good on these claims and their implications for law in our time. First, I will lay out the basic frame story of Mulholland Drive, describing the "real-life" events out of which Diane Selwyn's
dream fantasy takes shape. Second, I will interpret the narrative configuration of that fantasy in an effort to crack the dream code. I will then withdraw
to a third reality, the reality of the abyss, in an effort to interpret Lynch's film
vision and its philosophical implications. As part of this effort, I will link
Lynch's seriation 8 of destabilizing subversions to the aesthetic of the post-
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modern sublime. I associate the latter with the contemporary emergence of
neo-baroque culture. Lastly, I will enwrap these interpretive accounts in the
narrative framework of a failed initiatory rite. Relying upon Jean-Joseph
Game's analysis of the subverted rite of royal succession encoded in the story
of Oedipus, we will encounter the genealogy of baroque law, a tragic sign of
our inability to sustain law's legitimation.

The Basic Frame Story
First-time viewers of Mulholland Drive must wait for most of the film to pass
before they wake up to the real plot structure of Diane Selwyn's dream fantasy. Only then do we see the details from Diane's real life that have supplied
both the motive force and the code for interpreting the dream/mystery that
we have been watching. Let us begin from the vantage point of this awakening. Here (in retrospect) is what we come to understand:
Diane Selwyn is a Hollywood sta rlet wannabe. She has traveled south
from Deep Rivers, Ontario, to sunny Los Angeles, where she takes up residence in a seedy bungalow complex called Sierra Bonita. Diane auditions for
the starring role in The Silvia North Story, but the part goes to a su ltry, seductive woman named Camilla Rhodes. Some time thereafter, Diane and
Camilla begin an intense love affair. As Camilla's star rises, however, Diane's
falls. Diane's dreams of stardom ultimately crumble as she finds herself living
a grimy hand-to-mouth existence on the dark outskirts of Hollywood's lucrative dream-weaving industry. When acting crumbs, tossed her way by
Camilla, grow too scarce to live on, Diane plummets to the diminished state
of a drug-addled prostitute.
The final blow comes when Camilla tells Diane that their affair must end.
To add insult to injury, Diane soon learns that Camilla has acquired a new
love object-in fact, two. This knowledge comes to Diane only after Camilla
persuades her to attend a glamorous Hollywood party at the suitably upscale
home of director Adam Kesher, located on Mulholland Drive. The occasion,
it turns out, is the announcement of Adam and Camilla's engagement. This
news is delivered with sadistic glee, since both Adam and Camilla are well
aware of Diane's continued infatuation with Camilla. The final humiliation,
laying bare the annihilation of Diane's hopes and desires, comes in the shape
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of a blonde starlet who exchanges, before Diane's suffering gaze, erotic whispers and a passionate kiss with Camilla. Diane has been supplanted on every
front.
Overcome by jealousy and rage, Diane hires a hit man named Joe to murder Camilla. Diane meets Joe in a diner called Winkle's, where they are
served by a waitress named Betty. Joe informs Diane that when she sees the
blue key in her apartment she will know that the deed has been done. Diane
hands over the cash and the deal is clinched. Diane has set in motion the machinery of death on the heels of thwarted desire.
When Diane later spots the blue key on her coffee table she realizes the irrevocability of her action. She also learns from a neighbor that two detectives
are looking for her. Fear and guilt play havoc with Diane's mind. She hallucinates Camilla returning to the living and recalls (or fantasizes) their making love on Diane's couch. This imagery feeds a masturbatory impulse that
desperately mingles violence and pleasure. A knock at the door triggers a final psychotic break. Diane hallucinates two tiny parental figures crawling
under the front door. As they grow to adult size, their hands flail madly in
the air as they rush toward her, screaming. Diane backs away into the bedroom. She, too, screams madly and flails in panic as she scurries backwards.
Falling onto her bed, Diane blindly reaches out to an end table drawer, pulls
out a revolver, places it in her mouth, and pulls the trigger. Her body lies
sprawled on the bed.

The Initial Dream Work: An Interpretation
Life is a great dream; to dream in this big dream, and to speak of
dreams, is to not know where the illusion is going to end.
Tun-ch 'cng, E11clia11t111e11t and Dise11cha11t111e11t

[Mulholland Drive ]- a love story in the city of dreams.
From the Mulholla11d Drive press kit

Mulholland Drive begins with images of a surreal jitterbug sequence.9 We

then see Diane Selwyn flanked by two parental figures-the same figures
who, in their frenzied, Furies-like reappearance at the end of the film, trigger
Diane's suicide. Tightly shot in the opening sequence, together the three
evoke the image of a strange Mt. Rushmore, with the face of Diane's
(deceased) aunt flittering onto the screen and then off to the lower right.
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This aural-visual pun of the "jilter" (the jitterbug, the jittery image) is suggestive of the overdetermined meanings that populate Diane's dream world.
A similarly floating camera will later become the telltale sign of the dreamer
approaching (but never quite achieving) awareness of herself dreaming. And,
indeed, the next image that we see is that of a bed, with maroon sheets, even
as we hear the deep, regular breathing of the sleeper. The first-time viewer
remains in the dark, but the site of Diane's dream production (and death)
has been announced.
The scene then shifts to a long black limousine Wending its way at night
down a sinuous road . We see Camilla seated in back. The car stops unexpectedly, somewhere on Mulholland Drive. The two men up front turn toward Camilla with revolvers pointed toward her. "We don 't stop here,"
Camilla plaintively utters. "Get out," they say. With the aid of retrospect, we
recognize this scene. It is from the time Camilla sent a limo to pick Diane up
and take her to director Adam Kesher's home on Mulholland Drive, the
fateful site of Camilla's and Adam's wedding announcement. As Diane's
dream begins, we are about to revisit the scene where her Hollywood dreams
Were finally shattered, sending Diane cascading down a desperate path of
jealous rage. The first link between desire and death has been made.
In Diane's dream fantasy, Camilla sits in Diane's place in the limo; her
death is imminent. But a sudden freak accident intervenes. Joyriding teenagers are speeding blindly down Mulholland Drive. We see two of them, ominously standing and lurching with the curves of the road, their hands flailing
as they scream with the joyful speed of it. 10 With sudden violence, their car
crashes into the limo. The men with guns are killed instantly. Camilla stumbles out of the smoking wreckage. She is intact, we will learn, but for a cut on
her head, and total amnesia. Camilla stumbles down into the streets of Hollywood, finally finding her way to the idealized cottage community where
Diane will meet her again.
But this is not Camilla, nor will it be Diane who meets her. Diane has become "Betty," a naive, perky ingenue just arrived in Hollywood to realize her
dreams of stardom. She is all that Diane wished to be in real life. As for her
counterpart, Camilla too has now become all that Diane would have wished
her to be: a blank screen, ready for Diane's fantasies (of love and desire) to
play out, as they soon will. 11 Camilla sees a film poster on a bathroom wall in
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Diane's apartment. It features Rita Hayworth playing the star role in Gilda
(1946). Camilla will thereafter assume the famous seductress's name as her
own. In Diane's fantasy, Camilla has become "Rita," a Hollywood creation
and Diane's ideal (imaginary) object of desire. " Together, she and Betty will
reconsummate an idealized love affair as they stage (like a play within a play)
the mystery story of Rita's lost identity. But, the originating reality of
Camilla's death hangs over the fantasy like a dark cloud. And intimations of
discovery (as the dreamer, like Oedipus, unravels the riddle of her identity
and her crime) are already apparent.
Consider the two detectives, standing beside the wreckage left by the joyriding teenagers' crash into Camilla's limo. In their oddly wooden conversation they recapitulate the dream weaver's own dynamic logic. "Looks like
someone's missing," says one. '·Just what I was thinking," says the other. It is
the dream logic of the whodunit in the existential, postmodern mystery (or
crime noir) 13 genre of Samuel Beckett and Paul Auster." In her dream fantasy, Diane is missing (she has become Betty), and Camilla is missing as well
(she has become Rita). The challenge of solving the dream riddle of Rita's
missing identity and the real-life mystery of Camilla's death (she was murdered by a hit man hired by Diane) propels the dream forward. The solution,
however, already lingers in the distance, in a future that has already passed,
in the terrible reality of identity revealed.
Self-knowledge, in this Oedipean world, is an excavated horror. 15 Like
Oedipus, Diane/Betty is a detective bent on solving the mystery of identity.
Ostensibly, it is Rita's identity that she is seeking, but in reality it is her own
self that lay hidden in both, for Diane is the split psyche known as
"Betty/Rita." They are but two (idealized) forms of Diane's unstable, borderline personality. In this respect, one might say that the film's drama is fueled
by the return of the repressed. 16 As in the fabled One Thousand and One

Nights, the mystery's tension lies in the dream's ingenious strategies for postponing the dreamer's demise. Like the reader of Scheherazade's serial narrative arabesques, each of which gives the teller yet another day of life for the
next installment to unfold, the viewer of Mulholland Drive is kept in a precarious state of suspense: for how long will Diane's defensive dream maneu vers stave off the terror (of forbidden knowledge) from which she is fleeing?
For how long will the fantasy realm of splitting and idealization delay con-
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frontation, and ultimate fusion, with the monster (the Thing behind the
diner, the one "who is doing it") that she has become?
In Diane's dream, erotic fantasy desperately competes with guilt, fear of
discovery, and the reality principle of death itself. The key tools of Diane's
psychological dream defense are familiar ones in the Freudian toolkit: idealization, splitting, condensation, and role reversal. Diane becomes someone
else to avoid the guilt of Diane's murderous deed. She becomes the idealized
Betty to preserve her identification with (and jealous longing for) Camilla's
Hollywood success. Betty is the idealized part of Diane that has been spoiled
and lost, sacrificed on the altar of Hollywood's cruel, often destructive reality. The persona of "Betty" preserves the unspoiled Hollywood of the
youthful Diane's na·ive dreams and thwarted ambitions. In her fantasy, Diane
realizes the talent and success that she never could achieve in real life. Wish
fulfillment, denial, and idealization: in her dream, it is Diane who displaces
her rival, Camilla, rather than the other way around; it is Diane who restores
her lost love relationship with Camilla; and it is Diane who denies, by interrupting with a timely car accident, Camilla's murder. It is Diane as well who
idealizes the real by splitting off the treacherous Hollywood into a surreal,
pastel-lit, benevolent wonder-world-a domain that is infiltrated by corrupt
and omnipresent conspiratorial forces.
Like a latter-day Prospero, Diane magically enfolds Camilla in the oblivion of amnesia, so that the illusion may go on, at least for a while, until the
mystery's solution can no longer be put off. Diane's ultimate confrontation
with herself, as the monstrous source of her unacceptably violent impulses,
will mark the mystery's end. When Diane merges with the monstrous corpse
on the bed with maroon covers, when she fuses with the monster behind the
diner, when, in short, she assumes the identity that her dream fantasy so desperately fights to disguise, the idealized dream world vanishes. The defense is
over. She is no longer Betty, and Camilla is dead, the victim of Diane's jealous rage. Diane's ensuing judgment is severe: the sentence is death, by suicide.
Along the way to this horrific denouement, Lynch offers clues that disturb
the outward serenity and apparent stability of Diane's dream fantasy. Consider, for example, the scene of the two friends who meet at Winkie's, a replica of the real-life diner where Diane's murder plot was put into action.
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Here we encounter the source of Diane's consciously unacceptable violence,
her interior horror. In this scene, the camera floats and sways as if caught in
the eddies of an unseen current. This happens, it seems, whenever we come
close to the dream's horrific point of origin. Not surprisingly, then, it is at
Winkie's that Diane's horror assumes tangible form. Like a Rosetta stone of
the unnameable, it is momentarily figured. Just before it appears, we hear
one friend tell the other (although it might as well be a patient recounting to
his therapist) a dream that has been recurring. The dream takes place at this
very Winkie's, he says, and it scares him to death. There is a monster behind
the diner. "He's the one who is doing it," the friend reports.
Despite his terror, he allows himself to be persuaded by his friend's (the
"analyst's") calm, disarmingly matter-of-fact encouragement: "So, you came
to see if he's out there." And so, in the spirit of therapeutic reality testing,
they go behind the diner to look. In a masterfully timed sequence of suspense and horror, the monster-which rationality would dispel-duly appears. Upon glimpsing it, the friend loses his breath and falls to the ground,
apparently lifeless. Contact with forbidden knowledge equals death. That is
what this dream-within-a-dream sequence tells us. Reason, it seems, contains
a trap door-into the abyss. (So much for testing reality.) And, indeed, the
dreamer's prophetic (Diane's hidden) knowledge is accurate, as Diane's subsequent suicide makes plain.
These clues, among others, leave no doubt that the dreamer is on the trail
of solving the mystery of her own identity." Powerful psychological forces
have been unleashed to preserve the dream-denial that is under way. But no
less powerful forces of detection are also at work, threatening to disrupt the
dreamer's desperate defensive wish for complacency. At the top of the pyramid of detection/surveillance/power is Mr. Rocque, a mysterious Howard
Hughes-type figure who watches, and apparently controls, everything he sees
from an electronically equipped living room sealed behind glass. 18 It is Mr.
Rocque who will set loose, always by intimation (as if to ensure deniability),
a wide range of forces aimed at finding "the missing girl." For example,
through a series of phone call that Mr. Rocque initiates, the search reaches
the streets. Joe the hit man (Diane's pimp?) asks a prostitute (Diane's reallife co-worker?), "Any new girls on the street?" At least two different elements of "detection" may be discerned here. On the one hand, Joe may be
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acting as a stand-in for the detectives who are actively seeking to solve the
murder mystery involving Camilla Rhodes. Subconsciously, Diane knows
that she is a suspect in the crime investigation under way. On the other hand,
it is also possible that Diane's repressed rage against Camilla has taken the
form of yet another role reversal. Perhaps Diane's unconscious has placed
Camilla on the streets, substituting her professional rival (and fickle partner
in love) for Diane's own unconscionable fall to soliciting tricks on the dismal
outskirts of Hollywood.
On a more condensed, symbolic level, the search for the "missing girl"
takes the form of a widely cast, strangely potent conspiracy bent on coercing
director Adam Kesher to cast "Camilla Rhodes" as the lead in his new ("starvehicle") movie venture. "This is the girl" (the exact words Diane uttered in
real life to Joe the hit man, consummating her contract for Camilla's murder) now becomes the mantra for Camilla's carte d'entree, the tainted "open
sesame" that lands her the part that Diane herself coveted. " "This is the girl."
We hear the words spoken by the Castigliane brothers at a business meeting
with Adam and his agent. The two brothers are Italian power brokers, one a
producer (whose wilting demand for the perfect espresso can never be met
["It's shit!"]), the other a lawyer (whose rumbling, animal-like roar sweeps
across the conference room when Adam hesitates to comply with the brothers' casting demand). Or consider the mysterious cowboy, who instructs
Adam on what to say when casting the star of his film ("When you see
Camilla Rhodes, tell them 'this is the girl."'). He speaks in sphinxlike riddles,20 but his sinister intent, and the means of carrying out his implicit
threats, are never in doubt.
In short, the tools of detection run the gamut: from brute force to riddles
to a far-flung conspiratorial network of social forces (lawyers, producers,
mobsters, banks)-all equipped with the means to cut off and control, by
any means necessary, the object of their power. We will return later to reexamine this symbolic reference to criminal, financial, legal, and corporate
forms of power in contemporary society.
In the penultimate scene of the film Betty and Rita rush into the blue-lit
night (with its symbolic reference to the underworld) to the windswept Cafe
Silencio. This scene embodies both the interpretive key to, as well as the final
disruption of, the outward order of the dreamer's dream flow. Like the
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dream-within-a-dream sequence featuring the two friends in the dream diner
called Winkie's, here too the camera bobs and sways, in the grip of a hidden
current, as we peer down the blue-lit alley that leads to the cafe. This visual
trope21 links the monster behind the diner (the one "who is doing it") with a
complementary figuration: the maestro, the magician, the poet, the film director. Inside Cafe Silencio, we encounter him, the master of ceremonies, a
Prospero-like figure and a likely stand-in for film director Lynch himself. (Is
it not Lynch-this film, this fantasy, this play of reality and illusion-that is,,,
after all, "doing it"?) "No hay banda," the emcee cries. "There is no ban d·
Seated in the sparsely populated late-night theater (of dreams?), Rita and
Betty watch and listen as the emcee/magician reveals the truth of illusion:
"This is all a tape recording, and yet we hear a band ... if we want to hear."
In the baroque play of reality and illusion, la vida es suefw (life is a dream).
The poet-director controls it all, under the immobile gaze of his muse, the
blue-haired lady, who sits like a statue in the box seat above the stage. Like
the monster's artistic double (on the stage, rather than behind it), the maestro too is the one "who is doing it." He too channels the flow of Eros. His
power is evident when he raises his arms above his head and a mighty roll of
thunder rattles the theater-like the atavistic roar that opens Joyce's Finne-

gan's Wake, the unwordable thunder sound of Zeus, father of the gods.
Significantly, it is when the Lynchian maestro reveals to the audience the
illusions of sight and sound, making plain that it is he who is directing them
at will, that Diane's dream finally reaches its violent denouement. Knowl edge (of the dream code) upon announcing its illusory nature terminates the
play (of illusion). When Betty [Diane] and Rita [Camilla] behold this tutelary guide, and wordlessly make his Teiresian knowledge their own, the
dream veil is lifted, and Diane awakens. The terror of what she has learned
will now precipitate her demise. Her epiphanic knowledge will become real.
Knowledge equals death. It is just as the surrogate dreamer in the diner predicted. The one who confronts the source of the mystery-the terrible reality
of unbearable knowledge-desire-power, momentarily figured as the monster
behind the diner-must die. As the blue-haired lady in the theater will say,
22
uttering the final, Shakespearean words of the film, "the rest is silence."
One may, of course, protest: Who is to say that Diane's death at the end of
Mulholland Drive is real? Might it not be but a symbolic death? Might it not
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herald yet another dream within a dream, part of an infinite regress of enfolding arabesques, or nomadic monads, each a discrete self/world/reality?
Who can say whether there is another scene to come after the silence of dissolution in the monstrous abyss: the scene of yet another awakening, the beginning perhaps of the initiate's ascent, after the torturous descent though
hell? It is the scene that follows the mythic ordeal of being devoured by the
monster, a symbolic death that prepares the initiate for rebirth-into lrnmane (civilized) culture, as bios politikon. 23
Yet, the event of knowledge (in the aftermath of the initiate's symbolic
"death") remains elusive. To all appearances, at the end of Mulholland Drive
we remain caught in uncertainty. This state of unrelieved ambiguity, suspense, and agitation is the natural offshoot of the mise en abyme that Lynch
brilliantly stages in this film. Indeed, it is precisely this aesthetic effect, as we
will soon see, that links Lynch's film vision to the baroque sublime. The horror of the Nothing-of nothing happening-ramifies form as the infinite
distraction of decorative ornamentation, what Walter Benjamin calls "the
will to art." In pop-baroque art, evident, for example, in Andy Warhol's
endless seriations, denial through the diversion of physical sensation takes
the place of real horror. The frisson of the "cheap thrill" (the "spectacle")
substitutes for the soul-shaking terror of deadly desire. 2' But Lynch is not
toying here with the pop-horror of mere sensation. This is the Unnameable
rapping at the front door, bringing death. Whether, and in what way, the new
baroque may yet tap the mythic power needed to go beyond the seventeenth-century baroque tradition of paralysis in the sensate realm of empty,
infinitely ramified form, remains to be seen.
Before pursuing this possibility further, however, it will be useful to survey more closely the philosophical, political, and legal implications of Mulholland Drive.
The Dream Work Writ Large: Law, Culture, and Power

Lynch's dream play may be read as prototypical. Let us call it a contemporary allegory of unchecked desire and unregulated power in a narcissistic
World of mind and culture where knowledge is understood solely in terms of
mastery or control. 2' Let us call it a neo-baroque allegory: a symbolic world
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of unadulterated narcissism. Behold the Hollywood kitsch culture of solipsistic pleasure, embodied in Diane Selwyn's ambitions of stardom. This is
Mulholland Drive, a fantasy world fueled by a borderline personality's unbound desire-violent when thwarted-as that desire inevitably will be. As
psychoanalyst Benjamin Kilborne aptly observes, "In our contemporary
world it is striking how much technology feeds our illusions. People come to
believe that an ideal of themselves can be actualized." 26 Hollywood's machinery of dream production, further empowered by its alliance with new digital
technology, spawns a Disneyesque ideal that denies pain, suffering, helplessness, and ultimately death itself while amplifying the momentary pleasures of
narcissistic gratification. This too is a hallmark of the contemporary baroque.27
I propose, then, to construe Lynch's film w1it large as a baroque allegory,
an account of man's fate in late modernity. I believe this analysis shares an affinity with Jean-Joseph Goux's claim that we are now witnessing the final sequence of the profoundly disordered Oedipal monomyth that Sophocles recounted with exquisite precision so many centuries ago .26 Tracking Goux's
analysis, in what follows I will contend that the multiple pathologies of
knowledge, desire, and power that we witness in Mulholland Drive evoke a
profoundly disturbed rite of royal investiture, a subverted ritual of law's legitimation. As Goux puts it, "the cryptic soul is not all human; it has dark,
disturbing depths, unfathomable instinctual resources that elude humanity
and plunge into the dangerous darkness of animality." 29 Reason is an authority that can tame the soul's animal components. However, there is also the
danger of confusing the "inner (divine) man with man as a whole." That danger risks overlooking "the monstrous structure of the soul" (i.e., the unacceptable chaos and irrationality of the unconscious) and forgetting that the
"properly human part of the soul is only one element in a larger composite."'

0

Lynch's cinematic allegory invites us to restore (even if Lynch himself
does not provide) a connection that has all but disappeared from the collective consciousness of mainstream culture. The first requirement is that we be
willing to undergo a cinematic rite of passage. We must be willing to face the
abyss, the unadulterated horror of schizoidal desire. We must undergo a
symbolic death, in the grip of the postmodern sublime. The challenge is
straightforward: will we remain caught, like our baroque predecessors, in a
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perpetual state of agitated suspension between opposing (and equally unreachable) infinitudes of light and dark, trapped in the nauseating proliferation of endless matter? 3 ' Worse still, will our contemporary "failure of
nerve" 32 continue the diversionary tactics of mass culture-a pop-baroque
culture of spectacle-where sensory gratification and motion for its own
sake, a hallmark of baroque aesthetics, perpetuate our collective denial of a
deeper lack, a deeper longing (for the sublime)? Or will we perhaps grasp the
significance, the epiphanic potential, of the baroque yearning for the sublime-whether it is the sublime dissolution of self in infinite (albeit inhuman) freedom, or the Lynchian ("postmodern") sublime dissolution of self
in the terrible abyss of infinite desire, or the ethical sublime obligation of self
in response to the infinite demands of the other (in agape, love's paradoxical
marriage of the infinite and the singular)?
The contemporary challenge, then, has been set: for how long will we be
content to engage in the endless ("constructivist") play of reality and illu sion, mired (as Goux argues) in the perverse state of Oedipus, a perpetual
exile, foreclosed from learning the ancient monomyth's higher wisdom? For
how long will the pseudo-horror of mass culture, with its "pop-baroque"
aesthetic of shock and sensation, or its postmodern pose of ironic detach ment, continue to mock the real terror of initiation that marks the epiphanic
quest for the sublime? And, to the extent that this state of affairs remains our
fate, what hope is there for contemporary baroque law, a law whose validity
remains, but whose significance eludes us? For that is the fate of law when
the ordeal of justice lies suspended, eclipsed by the frantic motion of the ba roque impulse toward form piled upon form, matter ramified in a state of
hyperproductivity-baroque production on a colossal scale. Grant Gilmore
grasped the implications of law's going under in a comparably baroque
fashion when he invoked that hellish state where there is nothing but law."
Mass production in law as in art leaves a trail of desolation and endlessly
ramified unfulfillment in its wake. 3'
As an initial step toward explicating and justifying the foregoing interpretive construct, in what follows I will briefly recapitulate Goux's analysis of
the fateful history of the Oedipal subversion of the ancient rite of succession,
the failed monomyth, and then proceed to explore what it can tell us about
the configuration of law, meaning, and power in our time.
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The Subversion of the Monomyth: Oedipus Rex
In Oedipus, Philosopher, Jean-Joseph Goux reads the myth of Oedipus as an
anomaly. "Matricide, not patricide, is at the heart of the heroic myth in its
typical and universal form." Goux goes on: "The hero who is to become king
is the hero who kills the female dragon, the female serpent, the female mon strosity, in bloody combat. By murdering a dangerous, dark, feminine force,
the hero liberates the bride.""
According to Goux, the Oedipus myth disrupts this universal structure. It
is, in his view, "a myth of failed royal investiture, or of avoided masculine
initiation." It is this failure that links it to parricide and incest. Oedipus's
systematic disruption of the tripartite structure of the universal monomyth,
its "canonical schema of the triple ordeal," gives rise to three concomitant
pathologies or "sins." I want to interpret these pathologies in relation to the
symbolic order of the law that measures them in terms of knowledge, power,
and desire. Properly understood, this mythic code may lead us to a theory of
the rites that accompany the ordeal of justice upon which the law is founded.
Here lies the code by which to interpret the allegorical import of Lynch's
dreamscape in Mulholland Drive.
The ritual of investiture that the ancient monomyth embodies enacts the
normalization of power in transition from one generation to the next. In
short, it describes a rite of political and legal legitimation. That rite follows
the following sequence:
(i) "A king fears that a younger man, or one not yet born, will take his
place, as an oracle has predicted." The king does all he can to avoid this fate;
(ii) "The future hero escapes from the king's murderous intentions."
However, he subsequently finds himself endangered by another king who
plots his demise. The second king is unable to realize this goal himself, so he
sets the hero "a perilous task";
(iii) "The trial takes the form of a fight with a monster." The hero succeeds in defeating the monster, with the help of a god, or a wise man, or a
future bride;
(iv) "Finally, the hero's triumph over the monster allows him to marry
the daughter of a king."'"
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In the Oedipus story, the "perilous task" is avoided. In fact, there is no second king and no trial to overcome. Nor is there a monster to slay. Instead, by
sheer chance, Oedipus encounters a stranger in the road who turns out to be
a king, his unknown father, whom Oedipus unwittingly slays.
The youthful violence traditionally reserved for the great trial of slaying
the horrible, monstrous Thing has been misspent and perverted. The paternal, rather than the maternal, power has been vanquished. This failure to encounter the monster within spreads terror and plague throughout the land,
and in due course it will shatter Oedipus's soul.
Parricide is not Oedipus's only mistake. He also mistakes his own efforts
as the sole basis for his kingly authority to rule over Thebes. Oedipus persistently, and roughly, spurns the guidance of others, such as the blind seer
Teiresias. It is by sheer force of his own intelligence, Oedipus believes, that
he has solved the Sphinx's riddle. The arrogance of intellect, with its inflated
belief in the ability of reason to dominate and control irrational forces,
speeds Oedipus's ultimate downfall. Only belatedly will he realize his fateful
ignorance, and his true state as parricide and spouse to his own mother.
This symbolic disruption of mythic elements-perverse violence, perverse
knowledge, and perverse desire-becomes, in Goux's analysis, the chief
paradigm for subsequent western culture. For is it not, he argues, the ration alist philosopher who mistakes the power of reason alone to rule self and society?
The universal myth 37 that the Oedipus story systematically perverts enacts
a symbolic drama of legitimation. This political/legal drama is also a psychodrama in which the hero confronts the terrible Thing (the horrible monster),
accepts aid and guidance from tutelary spirits, undergoes symbolic death
(being devoured by the monster he must confront), and is reborn as the tri umphant hero, spouse to the second king's daughter. As Plato too conceived,
the nature of the city-state coincides with the nature of the soul. Disruption
in one domain is matched in kind with disruption in the other.'8
In the Oedipus story a systematic disruption of the monomyth leads to
pseudo or ersatz legitimation. Its proxy is baroque law, in a pop-baroque
culture steeped in sensation and denial. Oedipus's rule rests on a series of
deceits and perversions. His perversion of the monomyth not only generates
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plague in the community and a political regime of illegitimate tyranny, but
also a psychological trauma that results in Oedipus's emotional collapse, selfmutilation, and, finally, the infinite hardships of a lifetime of loneliness, poverty, and exile. The dire consequences of failing properly to undergo the rite
of royal investiture could hardly be more compelling.
In the dream fantasy of Diane Selwyn we discern a replication of Oedipus's (self-)deceits. Could it be that David Lynch has intuitively staged in

Mulholland Drive the philosopher-detective's arrogant claims for reason
against the backdrop of a subverted initiation rite, in the sense that Goux
describes? Do we not recognize the symptomatic pathologies of knowledgedesire-power as they permeate and bring to climax Diane's self-annihilating
dream fantasy? I contend that in Mulholland Drive we witness signs of an
important cultural convergence. The Oedipal subversion of the ancient
("monomythic") rite of succession and the postmodern-baroque nexus play
out together in the horrific sublime of Lynch's cinematic mise en abyme. In
what follows, we shall see what more may be said to render this claim
persuasive.

From Oedipal Perversion to the Postmodern ·s ublime
Elements of the Baroque Mind and Culture
Stripped to its barest impulse, postmodernism invites us to reencounter the
inherited foundations for knowledge, meaning, and truth. One may say that
this questioning represents a moment of crisis in traditional sources of
authority. The baroque era, during the seventeenth century in Europe, was
also a time of crisis and insecurity. Long years of warfare over competing religious viewpoints had created a climate rich in violence, cruelty, uncertainty, and despair. Events appeared to be moving toward a total excavation
of worldly things. 39 The yearning for stability and conservation was matched
by a deep fear of imminent catastrophe. As Maravall puts it, "a culture developed to bring under control not only religious disquiet ... but all the insecurity produced as a consequence of the long period of changes that the
western European societies had been undergoing for centuries." 40 This quest
for control led to authoritarianism, a form of monarchical absolutism.' 1 As
Benjamin notes, the baroque concept of sovereignty gave rise to a doctrine of
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princely power that can be understood in terms of the state of emergency.
"The ruler is designated from the outset as the holder of dictatorial power if
war, revolt, or other catastrophes should lead to a state of emergency."' 2
Baroque culture's main concern was to establish a m ass culture of con formity and control. It was essentially a visual culture, as is our own. In the
service of manipulation, it relied on the well -known efficacy of visual elements to seize and hold the public's attention . Mass culture thrives on the
sensible image for its power to capture, amaze, and stupefy. 4 ' Baroque cul ture resorted to broadly disseminated visual spectacles (emphasizing painting and theater over poetry and prose) as its main instruments of shaping
and controlling public opinion ("to color the soul with passions"" and to
"penetrate psyches and wills" 45 ).
Art, under the strict rule of rhetoric,4 6 had become kitsch, a mass culture
put in place for the sake of engineering consent through pleasure." "Opinion
moves the world," wrote Juan Alfonso de Lancina, and Hobbes attested that
"the world was governed by opinion." 48 The seventeenth century, like much
of the twentieth, had become dominated by mass culture-a culture of dazzling spectacle and splendor amid transitory fragments, the ruins of a profoundly disenchanted, devalorized world. 49
Yet, the pleasures of visual distraction notwithstanding, the sense of imminent collapse continued unabated. Baroque man felt he was "being driven
along to a cataract."' 0 Deprived of grace in this world, all things were gathered together "in order to clear an ultimate heaven, enabling it, as a vacuum,
one day, to destroy the world with catastrophic violence."" A state of emergency in the soul reigned in parallel with the princely state of emergency
without.
Creation without grace assumed a ghostly appearance. As in a dream, discrete fragments piled up. One lived amid ruins. And as hopelessness
mounted regarding the corrupted state of worldly affairs, aesthetic forms
proliferated. It was as if the desperate reaching out toward a distant heaven,
as if to outrun an encroaching darkness, could only express itself in further
decorative embellishments, like infinite folds within a compressed, but
seemingly infinite, translunary space. 52 In order to stave off the uncanny
monstrousness of empty form, to tamp down the fear of Nothing, what
Lyotard has aptly described as the fear of the nonoccurrence of the event, 53
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baroque man piles form upon form, as if only this colossal ramification of
matter could avert catastrophe." And so, like arabesques endlessly improvising their monadic design, baroque ornamentation proliferated, dizzying,
decentering, even nauseating in their spatial onslaught. 55
Each construction was a world unto itself, each soul a Leibnizian monad.
Hence the importance attributed to perspective. As Maravall says of the great
baroque painter Velazquez, "[H]e strove to capture what an individualhimself, Velazquez, the painter-had experienced of an object, thing, or person that had appeared within his field of vision." 56 As with the intensely subjective impressionist vision of van Gogh or the surrealist vision of Paul Klee,
to the baroque eye everything is a question of individual viewpoint, sensibility, perspective. Such singularity of vision serves as a much -needed anchor in
an endless sea of change. For the baroque mind in particular, impressed as it
is with the fleetingness of all things, the best to be hoped for is to capture a
moment, a fragment, a way of seeing this now before it is gone, swept away
under the force of internal collapse. "Nothing of what is today will be tomorrow," writes Martinez de Cuellar. "Nothing you are aware of remains.""
Under such conditions of extreme contingency, the baroque dream play
came into its own. La vida es sueno. 58 "The drea"in stands over waking life like
the vault of heaven." 59 As Richard Alewyn writes, "The baroque illusion is always conscious and intentional: it refuses to seduce the soul or even to deceive reason; it wishes to seduce the senses." Buci-Glucksmann adds, "If life
is a dream, the world is truly a theater." 60
Infinitely distant from a source of authenticating meaning, the neverending artifice of play (in theater and painting and elsewhere in public life)
became the baroque era's secular god. In the grip of such icy disillusion, under the intense pressure of fear and uncertainty, human nature revealed itself: a chaotic web of animal instinct and emotion, just as Machiavelli had
written. Politics was the domain in which human forces had to be captured,
turned to princely purposes, or simply overcome by the counterforce of the
state. Machiavelli's knowledge prevailed within the court culture of the baroque: human nature had to be studied in the infinitely complex folds of its
interiority so that state power might triumph.
The deeply disturbed relationship of knowledge, power, and desire that
we witness during the baroque era proper resonates uncannily within the
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cinematic neo-baroque dreamscape of David Lynch's Mulholland Drive.
Here it is plain that power, knowledge, and desire have grown potent but
elusive, masked yet mired in perversion. Consider the film's evocations of
power as: 1) remote, yet ubiquitous (as evidenced by the mysterious power of
Mr. Rocque); 6' 2) cryptic (as evidenced by the paradoxical cowboy); 3) vicious
(as evidenced by the brutish company lawyer who intimidates, and the thug
who pursues the director, Adam Kesher); and 4) spectral (a source of wonder
and illusion, as evidenced by the emcee-magician of Cafe Silencio). Or consider again the film's images of knowledge as: 1) blind (as evidenced by the
Oedipal detective Diane/Betty); 2) prophetic (as evidenced by Louise and the
riddling cowboy); 3) panoptic (as evidenced by Mr. Rocque's ubiquitous surveillance cameras); and 4) mantic (as evidenced in the revelatory dream logic
of the film itself) and initiatory (as evidenced by the emcee/magician as director/Lynch surrogate). Finally, consider the film's images of desire as 1)
monstrous (as evidenced by the creature behind the diner); 2) subject to idealistic splitting (as evidenced by Diane/Betty); and 3) perverse merging (as evidenced in Diane's borderline pathology, as she fuses with and then violently
repels, Camilla); while remaining 4) endlessly generative (as evidenced in
cinematic dream production itself).
Deprived of deeper mythic resources to counter the terror of death, the
baroque antihero, Diane/Betty, becomes trapped in a web of phantasmal de-

ceptions. Like Oedipus, by the time she confronts her monstrous self, it is
too late: all hope of redemption or transcendence has been lost. The implications of this allegory of cultural and intrapsychic dysfunction are no less
profound in regard to the new baroque (neo-Machiavellian) law and politics
of our time.
Neo-baroque Law
Baroque law, like its counterpart in baroque art, embodies a distinctly decadent form: the will to create has been divorced from the source of significance.6' This coincides with Scholem's formula for the status of law in
Katka's work. 63 As Agamben puts it, "What, after all, is the structure of the
sovereign ban if not that of a law that is in force but does not signify?" 64 In
this sense, the spectral reality of nee-baroque culture corresponds to that of
neo-baroque law.
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Baroque culture bears witness to recurrent political and legal pathologies
and their intrapsychic and cultural counterparts. A drama of denial plays out
in a dangerous dream world of aesthetic and violent deceits fueled by delusions of philosophical grandiosity and technological mastery over nature.
Without the capacity to confront (and ultimately transcend) the terror of
violence and death, life in this world becomes the life of the undead: the life
of the one who, "chilled in the full current of life, sees ... death waiting for
him. So he steps outside of life. If living means dying, he prefers not to live.
He chooses death in life. He escapes from the inevitability of death into the
paralysis of artificial death." 65 This artificial death is sustained by endlessly
ramified aesthetic forms-phantasmal arabesques, the ever-diverting spectacle of fantasy and dream weaving spawned by life-denying terror. This is the
baroque sublime, a hellish labyrinth of infinite form without significance. As
I have written elsewhere, "Sick reason compels obsessive repetition of a repressed excess that resists expression .... Life is thus lost in the living. In the
face of death, and the terror that it holds for us, we encounter the metaphysical temptation. Sick reason seeks a way out of life, an escape from the terror
of mortality.""'
Rationalist philosophy conspires with this state of denial. As Franz Rosenzweig noted, "philosophy might well have swallowed [death] up into the
night of the Nought, but it could not tear loose its poisonous sting. And
man's terror as he trembles before this sting ever condemns the compassionate lie of philosophy as cruel lying." 67 In the grip of metaphysical beatitude,
sick reason is haunted by an insatiable phantom-a dybbuk, the soul's dark
double, product of repressed forces. Dead, yet living, the phantom cries out
to us, like Lucy in Bram Stoker's Dracula, "Come to me .... My arms are
hungry for you." ~ But upon hearing her voice, our blood turns cold. There is

6

"something of the tingling of glass when struck" in her diabolically sweet
tones. It is the sweetness of Eros captured by death. To yield to the call of the
undead is to embrace death itself.
This retreat from life, this capture of the soul in the night of the Nought,
lies at the heart of what Nietzsche described as the spirit of decadence, and
what Freud diagnosed as the pathology of death anxiety. It is not the will to
power, but rather the fanatic's will to destruction.'" As Nietzsche put it, "Man
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would rather will nothingness than not will."' 0 And as Henry Birault has observed, "This will, avid for meaning, we see, is at bottom a will to annihilation, a will that begins by saying 'no' to existence, to our meaningless, immoral, unreasonable existence."' 1 Call it revolt, or cal l it the undeadness that
comes of unresolved death anxiety. It is, at its core, the pathological spirit of
resentment (what Nietzsche called ressentiment),'' a turning away from life,"
"only a death instinct.""
I believe that this retreat from life comports with what I have described as
the baroque (and neo-baroque) withdrawal to the domain of dream, fantasy,
and spectacle-a realm that is haunted by repressed knowledge (of the
Thing, the monster, the terror of unconscious forces). As in the Oedipus
story, so long as the monster has not been confronted, its unassimilated
force is bound to endlessly ramify spectral forms of denial. This is what
drives the mystery plot of Mulholland Drive. Like the dream domain of baroque spectacle, Diane's dream is maintained by the proliferation of endlessly deceitful forms (masking unacceptable rage and desire) on the one
hand, and the proliferation of tyrannical power, in its multifarious guises, on
the other (e.g., Mr. Rocque's seemingly limitless legal and financial leverage,
the brute force of the thugs who work for him, the legal force of the production company's lawyer, and the mysterious power of the riddling cowboy).
The fear of laying bare the irrational and pervasive forces that lie at the
heart of the culture of spectacle-disenchanted knowledge, unchecked desire, and perverse power chaotically ramified-prompts a state of emergency
within that parallels the state of emergency without." This pathological state
gives rise to tyrannical rule bent on denial and sustained by deceit. The political and legal state of emergency is the fruit of a perpetual legitimation crisis. In this sense, the failed initiation rite that Goux describes as the Oedipal
perversion of the universal monomyth takes on distinctly political and legal
implications. One may suggest that the dream logic that Mulholland Drive so
vividly depicts, expresses, from a deeply interior perspective, a state of political and legal affairs first conceived by Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Locke and
that achieved two distinct culmination points in the history of ideas: first, in
de Sade's sensate imaginary, and later, in Nietzsche's highly estheticized will
to power. Both historic culmination points reflect a profound eroticization
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of death, and both have been crudely concretized in twentieth-century totalitarian societies.
This historic shared pathology may be understood as the enactment of an
inversion of justice that parallels the Oedipal inversion of the ancient monomyth. According to this ancient model, which Plato also conceived, justice
requires a harmonic, appropriately balanced configuration among power,
knowledge, and desire-in mind as well as in culture. In place of that balance, in the late modern era we have witnessed a growing convergence between Machiavelli's understanding of brute power, on the one hand, and the
machine-like bureaucracy of the Hobbesian nation-state fueled by the Cartesian model of rational knowledge (authorizing total mastery over chaotic
nature), on the other. This convergence has contributed to the current impasse of politico-legal confusion which has helped to throw the modern nation-state into crisis. As Goux writes, "the tyrant gives free rein to his most
frenetic impulses, as he does to the numberless horde of passions governed
by Eros .... [H]e attempts to live out in reality what others only dream of
doing in their sleep."'6 In Mulholland Drive we encounter various signs of
this perversion of justice-as power, knowledge, and desire spin out of control in the absence of suitable regulatory norms to constrain them.
Recent prognostications of a transformed (postliberal, postdemocratic)
state may accurately extrapolate from, and diagnose, current legal, strategic,
and historical trends. For example, Philip Bobbitt refers to the "marketstate"77 that might now be emerging out of the collapse of the 'outmoded'
modern nation-state. However, I believe that analytical efforts like Bobbitt's
fall short to the extent that they fail to come to grips with the deeper cultural
and intrapsychic implications of the development they seek to describe. In
other words, they fail to articulate the degree to which newly emergent political entities, such as the market-state network or, for that matter, its deterritorialized ('virtual state') knockoff, the multinational terror network, may
embody a transitional stage in which nee-baroque representations of fragmentation, decay, and ruin, in alliance with Nietzschean ressentiment and
unresolved death anxiety prefigure more thoroughly reformulated political
regimes.
The cultural and intrapsychic cost of the state's relegitimation as a neobaroque "market-state" may simply have to be borne. However, if we con-
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tinue to believe that human choice exercises some efficacy in the constitution of national and global states of affairs, it seems appropriate that this additional cost be taken into account. In the final section that follows, I want to
take a closer look at what that price might be.

Ritual, Initiation, and the Ordeal ofJustice: Neo-baroque Culture
as a New Paradigm for Law
Neo-baroque law in the society of spectacle bears many characteristics of baroque culture in general, for here too we witness ramified aesthetic forms fueled by denial and devoid of normative content or compass. This diagnostic
of the cultural conditions under which law is now developing tracks Gershom Scholem's powerful reading of Kafka's great modern parable, The
Trial. Scholem's observations, which he recorded in a letter to Walter Ben-

jamin, are recounted by Agamben:
Scholem defines the relation to law described in Kafka 's Trial as "the Nothing of
Revelation." Intending this expression to name "a stage in which revelation does
not signify, yet still affirms itself by the fact that it is in force. Where the wealth of
significance is gone and what appears, reduced, so to speak, to the zero point of
its own content, still does not disappear (and Revelation is something that appears), there the Nothing appears. "78

The neo-baroque construct of law that I have been describing comports
well with Scholem's account. Neo-baroque law in the society of spectacle
takes on the phantasmal quality of the spectacle itself. Trapped within a
"jurisprudence of appearances," 19 law remains in force but lacks significance.
As the offspring of metaphysical beatitude, the byproduct of the totalizing
nihilism of Nietzsche's purely aesthetic will to power, law becomes manifest
as the pure "Nothing of Revelation." This is what is meant when we refer to
neo-baroque law as a monadic arabesque, a form devoid of normative content or compass-like other, similarly empty forms of cultural kitsch that
flicker across the screen.
In this respect, Benjamin's appreciation of the work of Carl Schmitt is
understandable. For notwithstanding our uneasiness in the face of Schmitt's
embrace of fascism in the i92os and '30s, it is difficult to dismiss the prescience of his thought. As Bobbitt writes,
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By stripping the State of any particular legitimating myth, however, Schmitt
thinks that liberalism perpetuates the greatest myth of all, the depersonalized, rational, mechanistic operation of the law. "Eventually, as part of the logic of the
process, all that will matter is that the machinery functions, on the one condition
that the subjects continue to enjoy protection so they can go about their own
lives."
Bobbitt goes on to note:
By thus making civil society the field of competition for numberless private myths,
the State sows the seeds of its own destruction because it has become marginal to
the production of meaning, while private interest groups, each organized around
its own myth, try to capture the machine of government. Meanwhile, the lives of
the citizens dissolve into consumerism, hedonism, and an attraction to cults.
According to Schmitt, "the value of life stems not from reasoning, it emerges
in a state of war where men inspirited by myths do battle." 80
Nee-baroque law, manifesting the normative vacuum that haunts the
market-state, risks Lenin's "law as terror" (what Italian fascists such as Marinetti viewed as a fusion of war and beauty)." It is the natural offspring of ersatz culture, the culture of spectacle and delight, which foments emotional
intensities that stand in for absented values. 'fhe element of terror (at home
and abroad) usefully fuels the simulation of legitimacy by interposing coerced commitment (for survival's sake, for the sake of ersatz freedom for the
ordinary individual, if not for the markets that measure flux and contingency
at home and abroad) 82 in lieu of freely chosen constitutive norms. Terror,
then, becomes the culminating logic of the culture of spectacle embodied in
the market model of mass media. 8'
The legitimation of the market-state on the basis of an ersatz ("kitsch")
culture of spectacle, in which baroque law predominates, also comports with
Agamben's notion of "bare life" as lying at the center of contemporary political life. Here the model of law as that which is in force but lacks significance comes into its own. 84 Homo sacer (what Goux describes as the
"monstrous part" of man's soul, his dark "animality," the embodiment of
what Agamben calls zoe) is the one left beyond the reach of grace. He is baroque man-the man who is constituted by spectacle and delight. He is also
Oedipus: the polluted man, the one whom we cannot touch without being
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tainted, for he is the infected source of the community's plague, the one who
must be cast out.
The rite of passage, traditionally associated with ordeals (namely the
physical/spiritual/symbolic sacrifice, confronting the terrible monster, the
horror of unbearable knowledge) , may be called for in order to help dispel
the pathology of homo sacer, and to instigate the creative process through
which the most authentic source of law's legitimacy, the possibility of justice,
may be realized. This ordeal of justice, which risks the terror of mythic injustice in its name, as Schmitt's proto-Nazi thinking disconcertingly reveals,
is set in motion through an ascesis, a deliberate deprivation, 85 a confrontation
with (symbolic) death, the annihilation of self in the midst of the sublime,
for the sake of epiphanic wisdom. In this completed rite (or ascesis) lies the
hope of humanizing law by situating the distorted and arrogant ("totalizing")
claim of the rationalist philosopher/detective (legislator/judge/prosecutor)
within the larger mysteries of chance, Eros, and mythic enchantment, which
remain impenetrable to reason. 86 Put in Agamben's terms, the challenge is to
civilize homo sacer, to remove the beastly taint of zoe ("bare life") and bring
him back into the human community of politics (bios politicon). 87 This marks
the completed passage from (symbolic) death to epiphanic affirmation, from
the "night of the world to agape," 88 the ethical sublime.
Absent the fulfillment of the Oedipal rite of royal investiture, which is also
symbolic of man's passage from innocence to maturity (from man to human, zoe to bios), the human condition seems destined to remain paralyzed
witl1in a state of perpetual diversion and exile. Continued domestic and
global crises are likely to prompt an ever-deepening legitimation crisis as the
public's willingness to submit to the state's demands for sacrifice weakens.
Sacrifice requires normative commitment, but this is not something the neo baroque culture of spectacle can deliver. Amid endless parades of empty
form, ersatz legitimacy may be dramatically evoked through the emotional
intensities of terror and delight. Yet, the Nothingness of Revelation that lies
at its heart cannot be evaded forever. The uncanny sense of imminent catastrophe-so pervasive in baroque culture generally and in the dream world of
Diane Selwyn in particular-persists, testifying to the power of the repressed
to return. We may seek to deny the horror we feel before the masked core of
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forbidden knowledge and desire, but in the dream life of the soul, as in the
dream life of baroque law and politics, that horror abides.
The edification of Oedipus, who after a lifetime of exile and suffering attains redemption at Colonus in the moment before he dies, anticipates the
reversal that is called for. The arrogance of reason is humbled at last by tragic
experience. Oedipus finally asks to be taught. Ritual is renewed, and divine
grace redeems him. 89 As Goux aptly notes, the sacredness of the impure meets
up with the sacredness of the purified. "By virtue of his avoidance and delay,
by virtue of delayed passage, it is Oedipus's entire life that has been initiatory .
. . . Existence itself has become the trial, and death the supreme passage." 90
If only the mystery of the symbolic had been confronted earlier, and
worked through in the ritual ordeal, symbolic death might have been substituted for a real one. Then, tragic wisdom might have been gained, along
with the possibilities of redemptive justice, for justice is the grail that the
hero brings back to the living from his ordeal in the phantasmal realm of the
underworld. 9 '
But baroque culture offers no such wisdom. Deprived of grace, unable to
confront directly the terror of death, baroque man remains imprisoned
within the infinite arabesques of his own fantasies and illusions, wrapped in
the multiple folds of denial. For him, life is a dream. This is what it means to
live in perpetual exile, standing before the locked door of the law, a door that
never opens, for the key-akin perhaps to the esoteric knowledge that completion of the universal monomyth holds out-has been lost.
The Oedipus story's systematic perversion of the universal monomyth, as
recounted by Goux, describes a state of cultural pathology, political tyranny,
and intrapsychic suffering. This is what comes of the systematic disruption of
knowledge, power, and desire. It describes Oedipus's fate, just as it describes
the fate of Diane Selwyn in Mulholland Drive. Like Oedipus, Diane's initial
illusion of control and her brash staging of the mystery of her own identity
can only quicken her flight toward tragic knowledge and death. For both Diane and Oedipus, knowledge comes too late. When the source of their denial
is finally confronted, when their own monstrous nature becomes too palpable to deny, the nature and extent of their blind illusions are finally apparent.
They have been wandering in a dream play, in a theater like the Cafe Silencio,
where sounds and images are playthings in the hands of the magician-
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emcee-like the sounds and images that David Lynch has projected onto the
screen before us.
"May ours be not the fate of Oedipus"-is this the fateful prayer of David
Lynch? Must we activate a new ordeal, a new rite of passage, in quest of a
new understanding of ethical enchantment?92 ls this the "reversal" of which
Benjamin spoke? By casting off the baroque pall of the Oedipal perversion of
the ancient monomyth, we may be rid of the "onrushing conqueror," master
of false mastery, who remains trapped in the infinite folds of arrogant reason.
What else do the "old books" hold out for us if not this esoteric knowledge
leading us back, under the tutelary guidance of "the new advocate," to "the
gate to justice"?93
But has cinema the power to accomplish a goal that is at once so vital and
so distant?•·• Do we yet have access to the cultural resources, such as the universal monomyth, that Lynch's film symbolically evokes? Lynch's cultural
diagnostic describes a pop-baroque culture of narcissism and spectacle that
represses the terror of the abyss with the mock terror of sensation. By staging
a horrifying mise en abyme set against this trivialized backdrop, Lynch provokes us to awaken to the real terror of the abyss. Perhaps this is the necessary precondition lo curing us of our neobaroque ambivalence and agitated
suspension between the unbearable infinitudes of light and dark. Perhaps in
our encounter with the postmodern sublime there lies a path toward completing the thwarted rite of succession manifest in the Oedipal claim to rational mastery and the arrogance of instrumental reason. By deconstructing
the impulse toward (false) mastery, amid the deceits of pathological reason
and desire, perhaps a way is being prepared for renewal, for an ethical sublime. Yet, the historic danger of false mastery remains close by-the danger
of the new myth that denies the spiritual terror of the mise en abyme, and offers in its place a different terror, and a different agency of power: the people,
the Fi.ihrer, the enemy of the state.
To paraphrase Georges Dumezil,95 if the culture of modernity has lost its
capacity for myth, perhaps it is already dead. But then again, perhaps the
death of modernity is but a threshold to a new cultural life, a new myth-for
good or ill. Like Dante's purgatory, Lynch's Mulholland Drive serves as a station along the way.
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Conclusion
The great gift of culture is to give meaning to, and in so doing normalize, the
constraint of desire. Accordingly, one of the key queries that lie at culture's
core is what is the proper relation between law and desire, discipline and
pleasure? What sort of constraint-in the name of what meaning or value,
toward what end-best serves our understanding of ethics and justice? With
this central query before us, it becomes plain why cultural criticism plays
such an essential role within free societies. The cultural critic affords the
community an opportunity freely to assess how power stands in relation to
meaning. If the rule of law is distinguishable from naked, self-interested
force (and law's legitimacy requires that this be so), then we need to ask: how
is that difference to be understood? Is the extant relationship between Jaw
and power optimal, or might it be afflicted by some as yet undiagnosed pathology?96 Based on the foregoing analysis of Mulholland Drive, I have attempted to suggest that a resurgent Hobbesian sensibility of terror pervades
the postmodern sublime-and its offspring, neo-baroque law. 97
Law's norms and imperatives-and the legal institutions and processes
(both official and unofficial) through which those norms and imperatives are
enacted-help to shape and inform not only the outward conditions of social life, but also the ways in which the state permissibly affects, at times
taking up residence within, our private lives. The nature of the debate, and
the extent to which it is a debate, over the means and ends of cultural (and
self-) production, set against the backdrop of state power and legalized violence, COI).Stitutes a public contest of and for mind and culture. Specific legislative enactments, social policies, and judicial decisions may be analyzed
from this cultural and intrapsychic perspective. As Plato noted, one may ascertain the nature of a society and the individuals who compose it from an
analysis of its legal and cultural institutions.9' That is the strategy that has
been essayed here. We have explored the cultural and intrapsychic negotiation of power, knowledge, and desire in order to ascertain and assess how Jaw
stands in regard to power.
By asking what are the cultural values and imperatives currently in circulation within society, we seek to learn more about the principle of constraint
that edifies freedom and disciplines desire. The examination of individual
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and collective pathologies in regard to this key function of culture drives and
informs the diagnostic process. It also fuels the ensuing search for corrective
measures. This critical inquiry also allows us to ask how law may yet respond
to utopian aspirations for health and balance in our individual lives and in
the communities in which we live. Central to this inquiry is an abiding concern with the existing configuration of knowledge, power, and desire- the
three constitutive elements that configure our individual and collective sense
of justice. In order to understand what sort of justice, if justice it is, lives by
the law of our time, we shall need to direct our attention, from more than
one vantage, to this crucial cultural and intra psychic configuration .99
But how does one begin such a multidimensional venture in critical
thinking? Where does one look for guidance when faced with the complex
demands of developing a cultural diagnostic? 100 Every culture in every age has
its Virgil, though his name may only be confidently uttered in retrospect. For
the cultural critic, however, such uncertainty cannot be helped . His task is to
name names.
In this chapter, I have presented the first installment of a larger work. The
first movement has taken us down (and in). The second will lead up (and
out). Since this is a venture in cultural criticism, along the way I have sought
the services of suitable artistic guides. For the initial leg of this journey our
guide has been David Lynch, a good choice for going down. Dark, irrational
forces crowd Lynch's abundantly creative imagination; and, indeed, this part
of our voyage has had much to do with darkness and discord among the core
elements of mind and cu lture. Informed by Lynch's poetic vision we have
encountered and sought to assess the current cultural configuration of
power, knowledge, and desire, with an eye in particular to the political and
legal forms that it adopts.
In Lynch's hands, the film viewer, not unlike the main protagonist in

Mulholland Drive, comes to recognize, as if for the first time, who and what
she is. This rite of awakening from a dream that had been mistaken for real
life has deep roots in both Western and Eastern culture. 101 It is a theme that
has been much on our minds of late, the fruit, no doubt, of a young digital
culture still grappling with its power to make (up) realities sufficiently believable to live in. 102 Asking what reality we are in, or prefer to inhabit, raises
a host of difficult issues that directly implicate the strengths and limitations
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of human power, knowledge, and desire. This is particularly so in advanced
technological societies where the mind's power of imagination quickly
translates into habitable worlds.' 03
Whether and to what degree pathologically configured intrapsychic elements find their counterparts in lived experience, perhaps taking root in the
culture at large-and in Lynch's world terrifying forms of pathology are
more often than not the reality we confront-brings to the forefront of critical reflection the need for appropriate regulative principles. Without them, it
will not be possible to restore a more healthful psychic and cultural balance.
As in the reading of fairy tales, and in dream work generally, a crucial function of initiatory rites is to consciously confront, even to the point of being
swallowed up by (in order to overcome), 10' deep-rooted terrors. We have explored this theme in order to assess the initiatory implications of Lynch's
cinematic dream work and its affinity with what was regarded in premodern
times as the ordeal of justice.
I have argued that the Lynchian dream state offers a window onto a political "state of exception" (in Giorgio Agamben's sense) 105 in which the terms of
law's legitimation (as well as the conditions of legal-political succession) are
starkly revealed. The dream oflaw's rule lays bare the power of the exception
that lies at its heart. A state of crisis disrupts the veil of normalcy both in our
personal life and in the life of politics. 106 By deliberately simulating on the
screen (and perhaps inducing in real life, even if momentarily) 107 such a crisis, Lynch's cinematic "mise en abyme," like all profound rites of passage, reveals hidden realities. 108 In this case, 1 have contended, the reality that we
glimpse pertains to the actual condition of state power in contemporary society. lt is a condition that corresponds in significant respects with past efforts to legitimate law through the state of exception. 109
David Lynch's film work addresses our need to confront repressed forces
of violence and disorder, both within and without. In Lynch's universe of
chance and contingency, the classical detective-philosopher becomes a figure
of derision and mockery. His logic is viewed as absurd in the face of irrational forces he cannot even begin to fathom. Comprehending the mystery
of a murder that has been committed, or of a self that is being enacted, requires more than a detective's logic. It demands an encounter with (and perhaps ultimately a surrender to) those very forces that threaten to overwhelm
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him. In Lynch's filmic universe, the typical act of "Sherlock Holmesian"
mastery gives way to a transformative defeat-the reconstitution of self from
the violent trauma of (symbolic) annihilation. Oedipus the detective-philosopher thus becomes anti-Oedipus, the initiate- initiator." 0
David Lynch's Mulholland Drive symbolically restages the Oedipal derangement of knowledge, power, and desire, and in so doing evokes our exile
from the originary order of the ancient monomyth. By going under, and
within, into the mysterious depth of unconscious desire, the dreamer gains
hidden/esoteric knowledge about the way things are, and in the process
learns who she really is and how knowledge, power, and desire actually operate in the psyche, and in the world. Here lies the symbolic code of law's unconscious. In the epiphanic completion of the rite of succession we reencounter law's primal dream of the ordeal of justice, the wellspring of meaning from which lawful rule originates. Perhaps we may also recognize in this
dream ritual a contemporary residue of the medieval ordeal, a trial in which,
in place of rational proofs, deeper forces reveal the accused's fate.'"
In universal dream space we enact the initiation ceremony. What was
once concretely ritualized and collectively enacted in the open amphitheater
and beyond has moved, first to literature and later, perhaps, with even
greater affinity for its highly symbolic psychic dynamics, to the dream space
of film. Sitting in the dark, we are absorbed into the mysterious terrors of the
unconscious, once again trapped in the belly of the monster, reliving the
dreamtime of originary mythic reality,' " awaiting some new form of knowledge coincident with rebirth , upon our reemergence under the sun.
Film director Lynch-like the magician-emcee in Cafe Silencio, a Prospero-like figure and Virgil-like tutelary guide to the underworld, the psychoanalyst's kindred spirit-plays out the contemporary role of the initiateinitiator. Diane Selwyn's story, like Oedipus's, shows us the face of intrapsychic and cultural-political discord in our time. In this way, Lynch, like
Sophocles in his day, is an invaluable cultural diagnostician. He too shows
what needs to be corrected, and motivates us to move toward rooting out
not the poet-messenger or the symbol-rich message that he bears, but the
pathology that the message reveals.
Ritual restores the moral conscience to itself (both in interior isolation
and in collective practice) . 113 Reactivation of the ancient monomyth of royal
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never arrive at the heart of the mystery-which is ultimately the mystery of himself
in a world in which signifiers arc no longer attached to the signified and the distinction between self and other no longer holds. See also Samuel Beckett, The Unname-

able (New York: Grove Press, 1958).
15. Lyotard associates this horror with the experience of Pascalian terror: stand-

ing before the infinite nothingness that surrounds us and in which we are enveloped.
The monstrousness of this infinite absence might be denominated the 'postmodern
sublime.' See Lyotard, "The Sublime and the Avant-Garde," 97-99.
16. Diane's fantasy of Camilla not only keeps her victim alive (thereby staving off

the guilt that accompanies murder); it also allows her to merge with the object of her
envy, and her thwarted desire. With her old identity out of the way, Diane is now
free to become an ersatz Camilla, and like Camilla, a star. This wish fulfillment is
matched by another, for in the persona of "Betty" Diane can now seduce Camilla
and thus regain the passionate love affair that she has lost in real life. Merging with
Camilla, however, also has the most devastating consequences for Diane. For it is
through Camilla that Diane ultimately tracks down her true identity, figured in the
end as a stinking, swollen, hideous decomposing corpse. This is the monster that Diane, in her own mind, has become-a creature not unlike the hideous monster behind the diner, the one "who is doing it." This is the monstrous force al the center of
things, the one driving the dream, a figure so terrible that to behold il is fatal.
17. An amusing joke, in the form of a clue to Rjta's identity, and her own, occurs

when the intrepid Betty conceives of a plan lo call the police to learn about any car
accidents reported on Mulholland Drive. "C'mon," Betty cries, "it'll be just like in
the movies. We'll pretend to be someone else." But al this point the deadpan revelation is premature, and it goes unnoted.
18. He, too, it would seem, is the one "who is doing it"-a surrogate monster,

the omnipresent policing agency of the unconscious.
19. Could it be that Diane, still enamored of Camilla, unconsciously seeks to

insulate her from Diane's jealous wrath by attributing her success not to Camilla's
talent, but rather lo a nefarious conspiracy?
20. "A man's attitude goes some ways the way his life will be. Is that something

you might agree with?" the cowboy asks the stunned and slightly bemused director.
But Adam Kesher's bemusement will quickly fade. "I want you to think about that
and slop being a smart alcck. Can you try that for me?" is the sobering response to
Adam's initial "attitude problem."
2i.

In addition to the signature of the jittery, water-bobbing camera, Lynch also

uses the trope of blue light lo figure the mysterious, abyssal force (of endless, unutterable desire) that makes things happen.
22. Compare Jean-Luc Godard's Contempt (1964); at the end of the film the di-
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rector cries "Silencio," after which the scene shifts, in silence, to a car accident, depicting both driver and passenger as dead.
23. See Mircea Eliade, Rites nnrl Symbols of lllitintion (Woodstock, Conn.: Spring
Publications, 1956), 136 ("Death prepares the new, purely spiritual birth, access to a
mode of being not subject to the destroying action of Time") and 62 (describing the
recurring pattern of "initiatory ordeal" as enabling the initiate to descend into Hell
alive in order to "confront its monsters and demons"). See also 135: "Initiation lies at
the core of any genuine human life." There are two reasons, according to Eliade: 1)
"any genuine human life implies profound crises, ordeals, suffering, loss, and recon quest of self, 'death and resurrection' "; and 2) there comes a moment for every person when one's life seems a failure, "an obscure feeling that he has missed his vocation; that he has betrayed the best that was in him. In such moments of total crisis,
only one hope seems to offer any issue-the hope of beginning life over again ....
[T]he man undergoing such a crisis dreams of a new, regenerated life, fully realized
and significant. ... This 'nostalgia for an initiatory renewal ' sporadically arises from
the inmost depths of modern nonreligious man. It would appear to represent the
modern formulation of man's eternal longing to find a positive meaning in death, to
accept death as a transition to a higher mode of being."
24. See Lyotard, "The Sublime and the Avant-Garde,"

101,

io7.

25. Following Wai-Yee Li, I use the term "allegory" to refer to "the rhetorical
procedure that emphasizes the relationship between different and disjunctive levels
of coherence." See Wai-Yee Li, Enchantment and Disenchnntment: Love and Illusion

i11 Chinese Literature (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), 161.
26. Benjamin Kilborne, Disappearing Persons (New York: SUNY Press, 2002), 113,
123 ("The more internal feelings are repressed the more individuals view their feelings
with mistrust; and the greater their dependence on appearance, the greater the ten dency to mistake appearance for reality").
27. See Heinrich Wolfflin, Re11aissa11ce and Baroque (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, i964), 33-34, 86, on baroque precariousness, and the fleeting ecstatic
sublimation in the absolute.
28. See Eliade, Rites and Symbols of Initiation, 125-26, describing how, over time,
primitive/premodern ritual ordeals shifted to literary motifs, which presented their
message directly to the imagination; this, in turn, has more recently shifted to images
on the screen-with directors like Lynch as initiate/mentors, dream weavers, and
tutelary guides.
29. Goux, Oedipus, Philosopher, 155·
30. Ibid.
31. See Wolfflin, Renaissance nnd Baroque, 34, noting that the baroque seeks to
stimulate the imagination through infinite figurations, and the suggestiveness of the
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indefinite. Cf. Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama (London:
Verso, 1998) on the baroque artistic imagination, and creation in a void.
32. See Gilbert Murray, Five Stages of Greek Religion (New York: Doubleday,
i955), 119-65.
33. See Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Uni-

versity Press, 1977), m ("In Hell there will be nothing but law, and due process will
be meticulously observed").
34. Wolffiin, Renaissance and Baroque, 38.
35. Goux, Oedipus, Philosopher, 2-3.
36. Ibid., 6.
37. According to this mythic account, heroic exploits-accepting the challenge,

trial, or ordeal that culminates in symbolic death and resurrection and the subsequent acquisition of the grail (esoteric knowledge/justice)-mark the cultural dynamic by which humans leave behind the na'ivete of childhood and are introduced to
a world of adult wisdom. See Eliade, Rites and Symbols of Initiation, 9. See also WaiYee Li, Enchantment and Disenchantment, 44, describing the classic Chinese literary
effort to assimilate the "supernatural woman" into mundane reality, thereby integrating enchantment (in the face of infinite desire) into schemes of order (disenchantment).
38. See Goux, Oedipus, Philosopher, 145, discussing Plato's methodical analysis of

the tripartite division of the soul and the correspo.ndences to how city-states are organized. Goux writes: "Each element is associated with a virtue: lust has the corresponding virtue of temperance; to anger corresponds the virtue of courage; and to
intelligence, prudence .... The difference between just and unjust political constitutions can be deduced with precision from the interplay of these three components
and the relation of harmony or disharmony that prevails among them, and the same
can be said of types of souls." Ibid.
39. Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 3.

40. See Jose Antonio Maravall, Culture of the Baroque: Analysis of a Historical
Structure (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 14.

4i. Ibid., 7i.
42. Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 3.
43. See Mara val!, Culture of the Baroque, 14.
44. Ibid., 262.
45. Ibid., 263.
46. Ibid., 74.
47. Ibid., 81-82.
48. Ibid., 98.
49. Ibid., 83. Maravall discusses a variety of mass media devices available at the
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time for purposes of emotional manipulation, including "books, commercialized
theatrical representations, painting in abundance, songs in vogue, posters, programs,
lampoons, etc."
50. See Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 3.

5i. Ibid.

52. See Deleuze, The Fold.
53. Lyotard, "The Sublime and the Avant-Garde," 99.
54. See Wolfflin, Renaissance and Baroque, 38, describing the aim of baroque art

as overwhelming the mind by using matter to create oppressiveness, irrationality,
amorphousness, "treating matter with violence."
55. Compare ibid., 45, describing St. Peter's cathedral, a masterpiece of baroque

architecture, in terms of the "viscous mass lowly oozing down the slope," with Sartre's description of the "de trop" in his first novel, La Nausee.
56. See Maravall, Culture of the Baroque, 174.
57. Ibid., 186.
58. Ibid., 170, citing Calderon's baroque masterpiece.
59. Ibid., 81.
60. Christine Buci-Glucksmann, Baroque Reason (London: Sage, i994) , 60 [citing

Alewyn].
6i. It is Mr. Rocque who moves the strings of worldly power, cutting off the director's personal money supply and shutting down his movie in order to force him
to hire the female "star" that Mr. Rocque mysteriously prefers. It is the monosyllabic
Mr. Rocque, immobile in his high chair in his immaculate glass-enclosed room, with
its screens that panoptically reveal all that there is to see, who cryptically sets in motion all manner of worldly forces to get his way, from the brute violence of the huge
thug who comes to the director's home, to the implicit violence of the strange cowboy who speaks to the director in aphoristic riddles, to the enraged film company
lawyer who screams like an animal and his comrade in arms, the powerful, immaculate producer whose impossible demands are manifested during a meeting with the
director and his agent in the grotesque gesture of spitting up an elegantly served espresso that tastes like "shit."
62. See Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 54-55 ("Inwardly empty

or profoundly disturbed, outwardly preoccupied with technical problems of form
which seemed at first to have very little to do with the existential problems of the
age-this is what most of the baroque writers were like .... [T]he baroque is not so
much an age of genuine artistic achievement as an age possessed of an unremitting
will. This is true of all periods of so-called decadence .... The form as such is within
the reach of this will, a well -made individual work is not." See also ibid., 66 ("[For
baroque man] the hereafter is emptied out of everything which contains the slightest
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breath of this world, and from it the baroque extracts a profusion of things which
customarily escaped the grasp of artistic formulation and, at its high point, brings
them violently into the light of day, in order to clear an ultimate heaven, enabling it,
as a vacuum, one day to destroy the world with catastrophic violence").
63. See Richard K. Sherwin, "Law's Beatitude," Cardozo Lnw Review 24 (2003): 685.
64. Giorgio Agambcn, Homo Sacer (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press,
1998), 51.
65. Franz Rosenzweig, Understanding the Sick and the Healthy (Cambridge,

Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 102. See also Eric Santner, On the Psycho-

theology of Everyday Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 13 ("The pursuit of the end of the world is ... fundamentally fantasmatic").
66. Sherwin, "Law's Beatitude," 687.
67. Franz Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemptio11 (Boston: Beacon Press, i971
[1921 ]), 4-5.
68. Bram Stoker, Draw/a (London: Penguin (1994 [1897]).
69. Cf. Jean-Luc Nancy, Freedom (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1993),
127-28. Compare the baroque impulse to yield to the infinite-an inhuman freedom

that offers no relief from ambivalence, and agitated suspense. See Wolfflin, Renais-

sance and Baroque, 88.
70. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, III, section 28, i63 (1969 [1887]).

7i. Henri Rirault, "Beatitude in Nietzsche," ii). The New Nietzsche: Contemporary
Styles of Interpretation, ed. David B. Allison (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1999), 226.
72. Sec Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, ed. Walter Kaufmann (Princeton,
N.).: Princeton University Press, 1968 [1895]), 108-9, describing as the "masterstroke"
of ressentiment its need "to deny and condemn the drive whose expression one is,
continually to display, by word and deed, the antithesis of this drive."

n

Sherwin, "Law's Beatitude," 683; Deleuze, The Fold, 74 ("The damned are

those whose last thought is a scorn of God because, when their soul vomits all and
can no longer enclose clearly anything other than this hate or this rage, it is the
maximum of all possible hate or the smallest amplitude of reason"). See also Peter
Goodrich, Oedipus Lex: Psychoanalysis, History, Law (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 245, linking the absence of desire in law to "death in the midst of life:

'tu morierus invivendo I Atique vivis moriendo'" ["You are dying in the midst of life I
and you live while deserving to die"].
74. Birault, "Beatitude in Nietzsche," 222.
75. See Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 65-69, 74, 97-98.
76. Goux, Oedipus, Philosopher, 148.

77. See Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History
(New York: Knopf, 2002), 9.
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7B. Agamben, Homo Sacer, 50-51.
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